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CONSTITUTIONAL MIGRATION AND THE MEANING OF  
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Abstract 
Building on research concerning constitutional migration, I show how constitutional 
provisions regarding religious freedom (‘subject to public order’) arrived in the Islamic 
Republic of Pakistan, not via colonial British or traditional Islamic sources—both explicitly 
rejected—but via deliberate borrowing from ‘anti-colonial’ constitutionalists in Ireland 
and, especially, India. Building on Ernesto Laclau’s (1996) notion of ‘empty signifiers’, 
however, I also unpack the shifting political circumstances that transformed the ​meaning 
of Pakistan’s borrowed constitutional provisions over time. Even as core texts 
guaranteeing an individual’s right to peaceful religious practice were imported, I trace the 
political, legal, and conceptual modulations through which certain forms of peaceful 
religious practice were refashioned as a source of religious provocation and, therein, 
public disorder. Far from protecting religious freedom, I show how the re-purposing of 
imported constitutional clauses tied to ‘the politics of public order’ underpinned the legal 
derogation of an otherwise explicit right.  
Keywords 
Constitutional migration, legal transplants, religious freedom, public order, empty 
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Introduction 
Notwithstanding more than 100 years of British colonial rule, constitutional 
references to religious freedom in Pakistan are not rooted in the terms of English law. Nor, 
despite its formation as an ‘Islamic’ republic, are they tied to Islamic law. Instead, 
Pakistan’s constitutional references to religious freedom are bound up with an 
attachment to enumerated fundamental rights—an attachment directly inspired by the 
anti-colonial constitutional politics of Catholic-majority Ireland (1922, 1937) and 
Hindu-majority India (1950). Like Ireland and, then, India, each of Pakistan’s three 
postcolonial constitutions (1956; 1962-63; 1973) clearly states that each citizen is free to 
‘profess, practice, and propagate his religion’ even as each religious ‘denomination’ is free 
to ‘manage its own affairs’. These two provisions, however, come with a crucial caveat. 
Both note that constitutional protections for religious freedom can be derogated in the 
event  of public disorder.  1
1 
Notes 
 See also Frances’ Declaration of the Rights of Man (1789, Article 10): ‘No one shall be 
disquieted on account of his … religious views, provided their manifestation does not 
disturb the public order established by law’ as well as the International Convention on 
Civil and Political Rights (Article 18) (1966): ‘Freedom to manifest one's religion or beliefs 
may be subject only to such limitations as are … necessary to protect public … order […]’. 
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What follows is an account of Pakistan’s relationship with this peripatetic rights 
formulation, drawing special attention to longstanding academic debates regarding the 
degree to which, or the ways in which, laws travel. In one early contribution to these 
debates, Alan Watson (1974) stressed the relative autonomy of legal ​text​, pointing to 
cases of direct textual transfer stretching all the way from Persia’s adaptation of the 
Babylonian Code to Scotland’s engagement with the details of Roman law. Still, Watson 
was criticized—above all by Pierre Legrand (1997, 2001)—for his failure to appreciate 
what Legrand called the ‘cultural embeddedness’ of law.  Moving beyond direct textual 2
transfers, Legrand insisted that legal transplants often ‘fail’ owing to intersubjective 
breaks at the level of legal meaning.   3
Watson and Legrand were interested in private rather than public or constitutional 
law.  But, even today, many of those with an interest in constitutional migration continue 4
to stress ‘Watson v. Legrand' debates.  In fact, recalling broad trends in linguistic social 5
(Pakistan accepted the ICCPR in 2010 with reservations regarding Article 18; those 
reservations were dropped in 2011; see Khan 2015.)  
2 For summaries of the ‘Watson vs. Legrand’ debate, see Cohn 2010 and Cairns 2013. 
3 See also Berkowitz et al. 2003, Osiatynski 2003, Small 2005, Arvind 2010. 
4 See Perju 2012, 1306-11. For scholarship focusing specifically on constitutional law, see 
Choudhry 2006, Hirschl 2014. 
5 For constitutional migration, see Graziadei 2006; for borrowing and transplants, see 
Cotterell 2001. 
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science—trends highlighting the gap between (a) textual ‘signifiers’ and (b) what is 
actually ‘signified’—particular attention has focused on the relative importance of 
migrating texts and what those texts are ultimately taken to mean.   6
This article examines the shifting meaning of constitutional provisions regarding 
religious freedom as they travel from Ireland, via India, to Pakistan. I focus, in particular, 
on the link between India and Pakistan, drawing special attention to the ways in which 
those who import foreign legal texts often engage those texts as ‘empty signifiers’ (Laclau 
1996). Seeing the clauses they import as texts with several different possible meanings, 
they proceed as ​political​ actors, actively pressing for one.  They do not deliberately 7
mis-read the laws they import.  They simply re-read them in ways that convey new forms 8
of meaning.  Essentially, they recast their preferred interpretation of this or that foreign 9
clause as a statement defining, even ​constituting​, their own indigenous legal order. They 
are not passive recipients of law; having actively imported certain laws, they deliberately 
re-make their meaning. 
As noted above, Pakistan’s constitutional references to religious freedom were 
drawn, more or less verbatim, from Ireland (via India). Within Pakistan, however, the 
6 ​See Saussure 1959, Levi-Strauss 1963. 
 
7 This argument was partly developed in conjunction with Aslí Bali, Hannah Lerner, and 
David Mednicoff (unpublished, 2018). 
8 See Nelken 2003. 
9 See Rosenfeld 2001-3, 72; Cohn 2010, 583. 
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balance of meaning associated with these provisions has slowly but surely changed. In 
particular, this balance has shifted away from any special focus on the rights of individuals 
or religious minorities in favour of those associated with Pakistan’s Muslim majority. 
Specifically, the rights of individuals and minorities have succumbed to protracted 
right-wing claims that ​some​ religious practices—no matter how peaceful—​offend 
Pakistan’s Muslim majority in ways that provoke public rioting. These 
practices—commonly associated with a tiny religious minority known as the Ahmadiyya 
(less than 1 percent of Pakistan’s population)—are not treated as ‘peaceful’ practices. 
Since the early-to-mid-1970s, certain Ahmadi practices have come to be seen as a source 
of public disorder, indeed, a space of formal derogation targeting existing Ahmadi rights.  
Self-identifying as ‘Muslim’, the Ahmadiyya are defined by their attachment to a 
late-nineteenth-century religious reformer named Mirza Ghulam Ahmad (d. 1908)—a 
reformer who claimed to receive revelations (like a prophet) even ​after​ Mohammad. 
(Typically, Muslims identify the Prophet Mohammad as the final prophet of God. ) The 10
claims of Mirza Ghulam Ahmad are controversial. But, precisely insofar as Pakistani 
citizens are entitled to profess, practice, and propagate their religion within the bounds of 
‘public order’, one might expect the state to ​protect​ those who engage in peaceful forms 
of religious practice. This is particularly true insofar as Pakistan’s ‘Irish’ and ‘Indian’ 
constitutional provisions sought to protect, not merely individuals, but also minorities 
(as groups). Indeed, as Granville Austin (1966) notes in his comprehensive history 
10 For an account of Ahmadi beliefs and practices, see Friedman 1989. 
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of constitutional drafting in India, India’s constitutional provisions regarding religious 
freedom—imported from Ireland—were specifically introduced to protect the rights of 
vulnerable religious ‘minorities’.   11
Unfortunately, this minority-friendly reading of Pakistan’s imported constitutional 
provisions has not stood the test of time. On the contrary, this reading of religious 
freedom has slowly faded in the wake of periodic but persistent public rioting—rioting 
underpinned by right-wing claims that Pakistan’s Ahmadi minority should not be 
construed as peaceful religious practitioners but, rather, as heterodox religious 
provocateurs. Indeed, since the 1970s, formal legal restrictions targeting the peaceful 
religious practices of the Ahmadiyya have come to be seen as entirely compatible with 
constitutional caveats stressing that constitutional protections for religious freedom can 
and should​ ​be derogated in the event of public disorder. 
This ‘re-reading’ of Pakistan’s imported constitutional provisions reaches beyond a 
simple account of migrating texts (Watson). It also reaches beyond a narrow account of 
legal culture insofar as Pakistan’s ‘Islamic’ culture might be thought to produce—almost 
inexorably—a failure of Irish or Indian law (Legrand). Indeed, Pakistan’s 
late-twentieth-century re-reading of its constitutional provisions regarding religious 
freedom was not tied to any reading of Islamic law. (In practice, the terms of Islamic law 
were explicitly ignored.) In the end, Pakistan’s re-reading of its imported constitutional 
provisions grew out of a ​politically​ nuanced appreciation for public rioting and, ultimately, 
11 See Austin 1966, 55. 
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the Muslim majoritarian claims underpinning it.  
To understand these majoritarian political claims, reaching well beyond the 
specific interventions of violent right-wing activists, I set Pakistan’s imported 
constitutional clauses concerning religious freedom alongside three further constitutional 
provisions—three further provisions concerning the ‘special’ rights of Pakistan’s Muslim 
majority. The first of these three provisions, drawn from a portion of the constitution 
known as the Objectives Resolution, notes that within Pakistan the principles of freedom, 
equality, and tolerance ‘as enunciated by Islam’ will be fully observed, even as Pakistani 
Muslims are enabled ‘to order their lives ... in accordance with the teachings and 
requirements of Islam’. The second of these three provisions notes that Pakistan’s head of 
state must be a Muslim. The third provides for separate Muslim and non-Muslim 
electorates. Introduced by Pakistan’s first Constituent Assembly (CA) between 1949 and 
1952, these three provisions sought to distinguish the special rights of Pakistan’s Muslim 
majority—rights that anti-Ahmadi protestors later claimed to defend.  
What follows is an account of Pakistan’s politically motivated re-reading of the 
constitutional provisions it imported from Ireland via India—a politically motivated 
re-reading shaped by these three majoritarian provisions and the violence deployed to 
defend them.  In Part I, I focus, primarily, on text, tracing the migration of constitutional 12
provisions regarding religious freedom from Ireland, via India, to Pakistan. In Part II, I 
12 Gary Jacobsohn 2006 compares articulations of ‘constituional identity’ in Ireland and 
India; whereas I stress similarities, Jacobsohn highlights differences. 
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track Pakistan’s re-reading of that text, turning away from Ireland and India to the 
majoritarian politics of public order and, therein, politically motivated efforts to conjure 
up new constitutional meanings.  
 
I. Religious Freedom in the Constitution of Pakistan 
In 1922, the Irish Provisional Government published a detailed compendium 
entitled ​Select Constitutions of the World​ to inform the constitutional drafters of the Irish 
Free State. Containing eighteen up-to-date constitutions—including, ​inter alia​, those of 
Weimar Germany, the United States of Mexico, and the Russian Socialist Federal Soviet 
Republic—this book was republished by B. Shiva Rao in 1934 to assist those addressing 
constitutional debates in India. Already, activists with ties to home-rule campaigners in 
both Ireland and India had begun to share constitutional provisions highlighting 
enforceable rights. In 1925, for instance, the anti-colonial theosophist Annie Besant 
published her famous ‘Commonwealth of India Bill’ containing an explicit declaration of 
enumerated rights in terms ‘practically identical’ to those previously defined in Dublin.  13
Indeed, constitutional developments in Ireland were closely watched in South Asia. When 
the Irish Free State gave way to the Republic of Ireland after 1937, for instance, 
constitutional provisions concerning individual freedoms were combined with a new 
appreciation (drawn from the experience of Eastern Europe during World War I) for the 
rights of minority groups. This change later resurfaced in the Constitution of India (1950) 
13 Sorabjee 2004, 115; also Austin 1966, 54. 
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and, later still, in Pakistan (1956, 1962-63, 1973). What follows is a brief account of this 
constitutional migration—this migration of legal text.  
 
A. ​From Ireland to India 
With specific reference to fundamental rights, the link between Ireland and India is 
unmistakable. When, following the forty-third annual meeting of the Indian National 
Congress in Madras (1927), Motilal Nehru responded to a British delegation known as the 
Simon Commission that was dispatched to consider new forms of shared governance in 
India, for instance, he simply copied key portions of Annie Besant’s earlier 
‘Common-wealth of India Bill’ to frame a notion of Indian ​swaraj​ or self-rule.  Indeed, the 14
fundamental rights of the so-called ​Nehru Report​ ‘were in several cases taken word for 
word from … [Besant’s] Bill’, with Granville Austin noting that these rights were ‘a close 
precursor’ of those that later surfaced in the Constitution of India. Ten out of nineteen 
sub-clauses, Austin explains, ‘re-appear[] materially unchanged’, with those concerning 
‘the free profession and practice of religion’ motivated, in particular, by an interest in 
14 Compare Ireland (1922): ‘[T]he free profession and practice of religion are, subject to 
public order and morality, hereby guaranteed to every citizen’; Besant (1926, 212): ‘[T]he 
free practice of religion, subject to public order or morality, [‘will be guaranteed to every 
person’]; and ​Nehru​ (1928, 101): ‘[T]he free profession and practice of religion are, subject 
to public order and morality, hereby guaranteed to every person’. 
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minority rights.  15
Of course this focus on the rights of minorities also reflected intervening 
develop-ments in Ireland. Between 1922 and 1937, for instance, constitutional reformers 
in Ireland had already sought ways to build on the ‘March’ (1921) Constitution of Poland 
(Article 113) in the course of their efforts to address the competing interests of (majority) 
Catholics and (minority) Protestants, supplementing earlier provisions protecting each 
individual’s right to ‘profess’ and ‘practice’ his or her religion with a further appreciation 
for rights   allowing each ‘community’, ‘association’, or ‘denomination’ (both majority and 
minority) to ‘manage its own affairs’.  16
These developments, originating in Eastern Europe before migrating to Ireland, 
were also accepted in India. In fact, shortly before India’s CA met for the first time in 
December 1946, three further volumes reflecting constitutional developments around the 
world were published to support the CA’s deliberations. Compiled by B.N. Rau, these 
15 Austin 1966, 55. 
16 In Ireland, this adaptation of the Polish constitution emerged in ‘dueling drafts’ between 
late 1936 and March 1937; see Keogh 2007 154, 389, also ​Constitution of Poland​ (March 
1921), Article 113: ‘Every religious community recognized by the state … may conduct 
independently its internal affairs; it may possess and acquire movable and immovable 
property, administer and dispose of it; it [also] remains in possession and enjoyment of its 
… religious, educational, and charitable institutions. No religious community may, 
however, be in opposition to the statutes of the state’.  
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volumes were collected under the title ​Constitutional​ ​Precedents​, with specific sections 
devoted, ​inter alia​, to fundamental rights and the rights of religious minorities. Volume I, 
for instance, included two sections focused on minority ‘safeguards’ with examples drawn 
from the ‘Polish Minorities Treaty’ (1918) and the most recent Constitution of Ireland 
(1937). The most important illustrations were drawn from the experience of Ireland, with 
all three of Rau’s volumes citing Ireland’s newly revised clauses concerning religious 
freedom:  
 
(a) ‘[…] the free profession and practice of religion are, subject to public order and 
morality, guaranteed to every citizen’ (Article 44[2]-1) 
(b) ‘[e]very religious denomination shall have the right to manage its own affairs, [to] own, 
acquire, and administer property, movable and immovable, and [to] maintain 
institutions for religious and charitable purposes’ (Article 44[2]-5).   17
 
Indeed, recalling forms of constitutional borrowing pioneered by Annie Besant, these 
provisions were subsequently embraced, more or less verbatim, by India’s own CA. 
Initially, India’s CA was supposed to be drawn from its provincial assemblies 
following elections in January 1946. Throughout the latter half of that year, however, 
elected members of Mohammad Ali Jinnah’s pro-Pakistan Muslim League worried that the 
provinces in which they held a majority would not be permitted to veto provisions they 
17 For an account of the redrafting process in Ireland (1935-1937), see Keogh, 150-73. 
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considered unacceptable. In fact, as a reflection of their concerns, they opted to boycott 
the CA.  Still, the CA carried on, with Congress Party leaders meeting in January 1947 to 18
nominate a special sub-committee focused on fundamental rights. This sub-committee 
met for the first time in February 1947 and, within just two months, it had completed 
most of its work.  As such, India’s constitutional provisions concerning religious freedom 19
(drawn from Ireland) were agreed by India’s CA even ​before​ India and Pakistan were 
partitioned in August 1947.   20
 
B. ​From India to the Islamic Republic of Pakistan 
Pakistan’s CA met for the first time on 10 August 1947—four days before the 
creation of Pakistan itself. Seventy percent of its members were affiliated with the Muslim 
League; in fact its membership was composed of all those who had won seats during the 
elections of 1946 but now belonged to so-called ‘Pakistan’ districts. (Additional members 
were later added to accommodate refugees from India as well as those in various princely 
states. ) Of course Pakistan’s CA did not proceed from scratch. The provisions already 21
18 See Rau, xxxi-lxx. 
 
19 Austin, 61-68. 
 
20 Austin, 63 (fn48). 
 
21 Within Pakistan’s CA, East Bengal held 44 seats, Punjab 17 (plus 5 for refugees), Sindh 4 
(plus 1 for refugees), Balochistan 1, and NWFP 3, with the princely states and tribal areas 
holding 4 (Callard 1957, 78-85; Binder 1961, 121-23). 
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drafted by India’s CA were readily available. But, even beyond this, the Secretary of 
Pakistan’s CA sought to provide his colleagues with India’s version of Ireland’s ​Select 
Constitutions of the World​ as well as a further compilation entitled ​Constitutions of 
Eastern Countries​ (1951). 
Featuring eleven further constitutions including those of the Republic of China, the 
Empire of Japan, and the Republic of the United States of Indonesia, this new volume also 
added a detailed appendix with clauses drawn, ​inter alia​, from the Republic of Turkey and 
the Kingdoms of Egypt, Iraq, and Iran.  In his brief Introduction, the Secretary of 22
Pakistan’s CA explained that, although there had been ‘a general tendency to draw 
inspiration from the West in political and constitutional matters’, the aim of his new 
compilation was ‘to place before the [CA]  … the constitutional practice in Islamic States’ 
as well as ‘some Muslim and non-Muslim countries of the East’.   23
Scholars of constitutional law have long argued that the best predictor of any 
constitutional text lies in the constitution immediately preceding it.  With reference to 24
22 The Second Series (Second edition) of Rau’s ​Constitutional Precedents​ also included the 
constitutions of Japan and the Republic of China. 
23 CA member Abul Kasem Khan argued that ‘[i]t would be idle to think that … institutions 
borrowed from any of the advanced countries … will meet our requirements’. ‘If you want 
to transplant any political institution [from the West]’, he added, ‘I am dead sure … this 
plant will not take root’. ​CA Debates​, 21 October 1953, 276. 
24 See Ginsberg et al. 2010. 
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religious freedom, however, the experience of India and Pakistan is different. Indeed, 
neither India nor Pakistan inherited its constitutional appreciation for religious freedom as 
an enumerated fundamental right from Britain; specifically, neither inherited its 
appreciation from the proto-constitutional language of colonial Britain’s departing 
‘Government of India Act’ (1935). Closely reflecting British constitutional traditions, that 
Act continued to see enumerated and enforceable rights as a constraint on the unfettered 
power of parliament.   25
Of course constitutional provisions regarding religious freedom are often treated 
as a distinctive legacy of Europe. Peter Danchin (2007-8), for instance, treats the 
emergence of these protections ​outside​ of Europe as either non-existent (in the case of 
individual freedoms) or derived from European intervention—what he calls ‘projection[s]’ 
of ‘​jus publicum europaeum​’ in a wider globalizing world.  But, again, this focus on 26
Europe, or European colonialism, is impossible to reconcile with the anti-colonial politics 
of Ireland, India, and Pakistan, each of which arrived at its own appreciation for religious 
25 See Austin, 58 (fn30). 
 
26 Danchin 2007, 467-8. When the Universal Declaration of Human Rights emerged in 
1948, Danchin writes that ‘most African and Asian states were [still] European colonies’, 
529-30. He ignores the role that newly independent states like India and Pakistan played 
in drafting this Declaration—especially, Article 18 regarding religious freedom; see 
Bhagavan 2010, Waltz 2004, Kelsay 1988. 
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freedom after prevailing norms in Britain were ​rejected​.   27
When Pakistan’s CA took up the issue of fundamental rights after 1951, they did 
not turn to Britain. They turned to India. In fact they scarcely altered the provisions 
concerning religious freedom that India had adopted from Ireland.  Whereas India noted 28
that ‘subject to public order, … all persons are equally entitled to … the right freely to 
profess, practice, and propagate religion’ (Article 25) (with a proviso that this right would 
not prevent any legislation promoting social reform), the Interim Report submitted to 
Pakistan’s first CA by its Fundamental Rights Committee stressed that, in Pakistan, ‘the 
right to profess, practice, and propagate religion’ was similarly ‘guaranteed, subject to 
public order’ (Article 10) (again, with a very similar proviso that this would not prohibit 
any legislation restricting ‘activity of a secular nature’).   29
In fact, moving beyond this reference to the rights of individuals, India’s 
27 See also Schonthal 2015. 
 
28 Many CA members stressed that Pakistan’s approach to fundamental rights should 
reflect principles found in the UN’s Charter of Fundamental Human Rights (see Barma and 
Chakravarty, ​CA Debates​, 9 March 1949, 30-31, 36); however, others dismissed this, 
noting that Pakistan should not ‘borrow … from a Charter which we do not know will last 
long’. ‘Our constitution’, they boasted, ‘will last longer’, Qureshi, ​CA Debates​, 10 March 
1949, 60. 
29 This ‘Article 10’ was retained as Article 10 in Pakistan’s first Constitution (1956); it was 
recast as Article 10(a) in 1963 and, then, Article 20(a) in 1973.  
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Constitution went on to stress—once again following Ireland (following Poland)—that 
‘subject to public order, … every religious denomination or any section thereof shall have 
the right (a) to establish and maintain institutions for religious … purposes; (b) to manage 
its own affairs in matters of religion; (c) to own and acquire movable and immovable 
property; and (d) to administer [that] property in accordance with [the] law’ (Article 26). 
Pakistan’s Fundamental Rights Committee simply reiterated that, ‘subject to public order, 
… every religious denomination or any section thereof’ would be entitled to ‘freedom in 
the management of its religious affairs including the establishment and maintenance of 
religious … institutions and the acquisition of movable and immovable property for that 
purpose’ (Article 11).   30
Initially, Hindu CA members sought to postpone any discussion of this fundamental 
right to religious freedom until a report from Pakistan’s Committee on Minority Rights had 
been published. But their colleague, Abdulla-al-Mahmood, deflected their concerns, 
noting that there was no cause for alarm because Pakistan’s approach to religious 
freedom had been drawn, directly, from India. (After all, protections for religious freedom 
in India had been associated with an appreciation for minority rights since at least 1928, 
when Motilal Nehru’s report was published.) ‘Clause 10 has provided the same thing but 
on a little wider scale than what has been provided in Clause 35 [​sic​: 25]’ in India, noted 
al-Mahmood. Clause 11 addresses ‘on a much wider scale the principles … [of India’s] 
30 This ‘Article 11’ was retained as Article 11 in Pakistan’s first Constitution (1956); in 1963, 
it was recast as Article 10(b) and, in 1973, as Article 20(b). 
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Clause 26’.   31
Previously, Hindu CA members had complained about the phrasing of Pakistan’s 
Objectives Resolution, arguing that any reference to the principles of equality ‘as 
enunciated by Islam’ should be qualified as ‘not inconsistent with the [UN] Charter [of 
Fundamental Human Rights]’.  But, even then, Muslim CA members sought to downplay 32
such concerns, drawing special attention to the logic underpinning their decision to import 
key provisions concerning fundamental rights from India: ‘We [Muslims] thought … our 
[imported] approach towards the rights of minorities would … create a better feeling’ 
after Partition, noted Sardar Abdur Rab Khan Nishtar, ‘and they [Hindus] would be 
considerate towards us also’. ‘[U]nfortunately’, Nishtar complained, this sense of 
reciprocity was missing: in the end, he argued, ‘they deny … us even this much’.  33
Clearly, an appreciation for both individual and group-based freedoms was 
present in both India and Pakistan. But, within Pakistan, the relative status of different 
groups emerged as a bone of contention. Accommodating Hindus with constitutional 
clauses imported from India, for instance, did not extend much beyond Articles 10 and 
11. In fact, Pakistani Hindus ​failed​ to persuade their Muslim colleagues to adopt Indian 
articles in two areas with direct implications for notions of religious ‘equality’: the 
first concerned the religious identity of Pakistan’s head of state; the second concerned 
31 Abdulla-al-Mahmood, ​CA Debates​, 4 October 1950, 78.  
32 Barma and Chakravarty, ​CA Debates​, 9 March 1949, 30-31, 36. 
 
33 Sardar Abdur Rab Khan Nishtar, ​CA Debates​, 10 March 1949, 60. 
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the preservation of separate ‘communal’ electorates.  34
 
C. ​Religious Freedom in a Muslim-majority Republic 
The decision to specify that Pakistan’s head of state must be a Muslim did not 
originate in Pakistan’s CA. Instead it reflected the views of Muslim religious elites serving 
on a separate advisory board known as the Talimat-e-Islamia Board (Board of Islamic 
Education). (This Board was convened alongside the CA by a sub-committee known as 
the Basic Principles Committee [BPC].) Initially, the views of the Talimat-e-Islamia Board, 
pressing for an ‘Islamic’ state in Pakistan, were rejected. But, in due course, these views 
were re-articulated in an ambitious 22-point manifesto submitted to Pakistan’s CA by a 
wider group of ulema (religious scholars) and lay religious activists.  This 22-point 35
manifesto, completed in 1951, was not rejected out of hand; this time, seeking to co-opt 
Pakistan’s elite religious opinion, the members of the BPC chose to respond more 
34 In India, Muslim (minority) CA members argued ​for​ separate electorates; see​ Bajpai 
2011, Chapter 4. In the end, Austin notes that Muslim CA members agreed to drop their 
demand for separate electorates ‘to ingratiate themselves with the Congress’, 151. 
35 At full strength, the Talimat-e-Islamia Board included Sunni and Shi’i ulema (particularly, 
Sunni Deobandi ulema from both Pakistan and India) as well as Muslim scholars teaching 
in Europe (for example, at the Sorbonne). The 22-point manifesto submitted in 1951 was 
formulated by a larger group, including the lay Muslim leader of Pakistan’s 
Jama’at-e-Islami, Syed Abul ala Maududi; see Binder 1961, 156-58, 213-15. 
This is the accepted version of a forthcoming article that will be published by Cambridge University Press in 
Journal of Asian Studies​: ​https://www.cambridge.org/core/journals/journal-of-asian-studies/all-issues 
Accepted version downloaded from SOAS Research Online: ​http://eprints.soas.ac.uk/25859/  
carefully. First, they explained that most of the manifesto’s key points were already 
covered by the terms of Pakistan’s (preambular) Objectives Resolution; second, they 
claimed that many of the remaining points (for example, a call for strengthening 
fraternal relations with Muslim countries while discouraging sectarian sentiments) could 
be accommodated in a set of ‘directive principles’. (These principles—once again 
reflecting constitutional innovations in Ireland and India—were non-justiciable. Their 
purpose lay in providing a set of guidelines for subsequent legislation or policy-making.) 
Still, having set aside most parts of the manifesto, the BPC returned to a single 
exception. That exception, noting that Pakistan’s head of state should be a Muslim (Point 
12), was put to a vote within the BPC, and accepted, in August 1952.  36
The second area pertaining to the relative status of Muslims and non-Muslims in 
Pakistan concerned the preservation of separate ‘communal’ electorates. This issue 
came to a head during the spring of 1952 when, despite their dominant position in the 
CA, several members of the Pakistan Muslim League faced serious intra-Muslim electoral 
challenges in the province of East Bengal. Briefly, the League intervened to prevent 
Pakistani Hindus (roughly 25 percent of East Bengal’s population) from positioning 
themselves as ‘kingmakers’, ensuring that, although Hindus were entitled to vote, they 
were only entitled to vote for Hindus. Hindu CA members objected, seeing this push to 
preserve communal electorates as a pernicious colonial anachronism. But, in the end, a 
36 Binder 1961, 226. 
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separate electorate for ‘non-Muslims’ was adopted by the larger CA.  37
On their own, these provisions concerning a Muslim head of state and separate 
Muslim and non-Muslim electorates sought to demarcate a special place for Pakistani 
Muslims. But, together, they also set the stage for a number of changes in the meaning 
of Article 20—changes in which, slowly but surely, ‘religious freedom’ came to mean 
different things for Pakistani Muslims and non-Muslims. The key distinction did not 
involve those who saw themselves as ‘non-Muslims’ (e.g. Hindus). The key distinction, 
as noted above, emerged between Pakistan’s Muslim majority and a tiny heterodox 
minority whose pattern of religious self-identification (as ‘Muslim’) was treated as a 
source of controversy.  
 
D. ​Religious Freedom in Pakistan: 1956, 1962-63, 1973 
Pakistan’s first Constitution (1956) was cut short by a military coup in 1958 led by 
General Ayub Khan. The so-called Constitution Commission convened by General Ayub to 
prepare Pakistan’s ​second​ constitution, however, retained all of the articles concerning 
religious freedom that Pakistan had imported from India—in this case, renumbering 
Articles 10 and 11 as Articles 10(a) and 10(b). ‘In the constitution[s] of Eire, India, and the 
late Constitution [of Pakistan]’, noted Ayub’s Constitution Commission, ‘fundamental 
rights are specific and protected’.  ‘The question’ was simply whether these rights should 38
37 ​CA Debates​, 19 April 1952, 220. 
38 ​Report of the Constitution Commission ​(1961), 101.  
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be, as in Ireland and India, ‘incorporated in the new Constitution’ or left, ‘as in the United 
Kingdom, to the fundamental good sense of the legislature and the [periodic] operation of 
the … courts’.   39
A public-opinion survey conducted by General Ayub’s hand-picked Constitution 
Commission revealed that the ‘[p]reponderance’ of public opinion (98 percent) still 
favored a special constitutional chapter explicitly devoted to the enumeration of 
enforceable rights.  Unfortunately, this preponderance was not sufficient to prevent 40
General Ayub from relegating these rights to an entirely new set of (non-justiciable) 
‘Principles of Law-Making’ when he unveiled his constitution during the summer of 1962.  
Enormous protests, however, soon erupted, and within a year a suite of 
constit-utional amendments had been promulgated to restore Pakistan’s fundamental 
rights to their original (justiciable) position. In fact, reporting from Islamabad, Ralph 
39 ​Report of the Constitution Commission ​(1961), 101. It is worth noting that, even within 
Pakistan’s first CA, the introduction of enumerated and enforceable rights was not a 
foregone conclusion. Already in 1953, Ahmed E.H. Jaffar anticipated the opposition 
articulated by General Ayub’s Commission: ‘I do not share the views of the framers … that 
it is necessary to enunciate the fundamental rights’, he declared (adding, with reference 
to religious elites, that he also opposed the elevation of any authority that might ‘limit the 
authority of … Parliament’), ​CA Debates​, 13 October 1953, 117. 
40 ​Report of the Constitution Commission ​(1961), 101. For the composition of General 
Ayub’s Commission, see Newman 1962, 360. 
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Braibanti found that no feature of General Ayub’s 1962 constitution ‘provoked greater 
opposition than [its] elimination of [fundamental] rights and the power of the courts to 
enforce them’.   41
When Pakistan’s ​third​ constitution emerged in 1973—following a brutal civil war, 
war with India, and the separation of East Pakistan as Bangladesh—every indication 
suggests that Pakistan’s new regime was familiar with the lessons of its predecessors. 
Specifically, with the end of martial law and the restoration of Pakistan’s National 
Assembly (doubling as a Constituent Assembly), Prime Minister Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto opted 
to retain the religious-freedom provisions that Pakistan had adopted from India. He simply 
renumbered them: Article 20(a), focusing on ‘individuals’; 20(b), focusing on ‘groups’.  
By 1973, the history of Pakistan’s constitutional articles regarding religious 
freedom could easily be read as a case of textual consolidation, or convergence, targeting 
global (even ‘liberal’) norms.  Indeed, as they passed from Ireland (44[2]-1; 44[2]-5), via 42
India (25; 26), to Pakistan (20[a]; 20[b]), the stability of these provisions is remarkable. But 
again, the challenge does not lie in tracking constitutional text; the challenge lies in 
grasping the ​political​ motivations that press pro-active constitutional actors to produce 
new strains of ​meaning​—new strains of meaning ​within​ a legal space underpinned by 
traveling texts.  
41 Braibanti 1965, 79. 
42 On convergence, see Finnemore and Sikkink; Risse, Ropp, and Sikkink; and Tushnet. On 
the limits of convergence see Dixon and Posner; Goldsworthy. 
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II. Religious Freedom and the Constitutional Politics of Pakistan 
Turning to an account of constitutional politics, I do not ask what a (traveling) right 
to religious freedom ‘truly’ means. Nor, turning to an account of legal culture, do I ask 
what religious freedom might mean in an ostensibly ‘Islamic’ culture. Instead, moving 
beyond Alan Watson (traveling texts; stable meanings) and Pierre Legrand (traveling texts; 
shifting cultures), I turn to ‘empty signifiers’ and the politics of textual ‘re-signification’ in 
the work of Ernesto Laclau (1996). In particular, I ask how a deeper understanding of 
Pakistan’s political landscape might help to explain, with reference to religious freedom, 
how ​one​ strain of meaning (linking the terms of public order to a common defense of 
peaceful religious practice) might give way to ​another​ (wherein specific forms of public 
disorder are used to achieve a targeted derogation of rights). What were the political 
factors that drove this re-reading of Pakistan’s imported constitutional provisions? What 
were the ‘majoritarian’ factors that, stable constitutional provisions notwithstanding, 
drove Pakistan’s experience with constitutional ‘re-signification’ over time? 
 
A. ​Religious Freedom and the Politics of Public Order 
Initially, some expected specific references to ‘Islam’ in Pakistan’s Objectives 
Resolution to undercut Pakistan’s constitutional commitment to the enforcement of basic 
rights (Lau 1996), pulling Pakistan away from a colonial approach to minority governance 
via religious personal laws toward a new approach in which the terms of Islamic law might 
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be used to define, or delineate, the rights of individual citizens—up to and including an 
assessment of who should be seen as a Muslim entitled to (a) serve as Pakistan’s head of 
state and (b) vote in its Muslim electorate. Until 1985, however, the terms of Pakistan’s 
preambular Objectives Resolution were not enforceable. In fact it quickly emerged that 
any state-based effort to define who was (and who was not) a Muslim would require 
either formal legal recognition for individual religious self-identification or some type of 
legal reform. 
Even before Pakistan’s first Constitution emerged in 1956, conservative religious 
activists sought to clarify the boundaries of Pakistan’s Muslim community—focusing, 
specifically, on the status of Pakistan’s Ahmadiyya. As noted above, the Ahmadiyya 
identify themselves as ‘Muslim’, but this identity is contested owing to claims attributed 
to the group’s founder, Mirza Ghulam Ahmad, that he was not merely a religious reformer 
but a prophet—indeed, a prophet ​after​ Mohammad. Some activists argued that, given the 
heterodox nature of this claim, Pakistan’s Ahmadiyya should be defined as ‘non-Muslim’, 
barred from serving as the head of state, and relegated to Pakistan’s separate non-Muslim 
electorate. In fact, after 1952, some of those previously involved in drafting the 22 points 
pressing for a Muslim head of state turned to anti-Ahmadi pogroms and public violence to 
make their opinions known.  43
The political history is somewhat complex. But, to begin, it is important to 
under-stand that many of the religious activists seeking to formalize a non-Muslim identity 
43 See Binder 1961, 259-96.  
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for the Ahmadiyya had opposed the Pakistan Movement led by Mohammad Ali Jinnah. 
They opposed this Movement as an articulation of territorial Muslim nationalism 
threatening to divide South Asia’s Muslims between India and the two wings of Pakistan; 
in short, they opposed Jinnah’s nationalism as a threat to the cohesion of the ​ummah 
(that is, the worldwide Muslim community).  
Following the creation of Pakistan in August 1947, however, many of these 
activists actually shifted to Pakistan seeking to rehabilitate their patriotic credentials. 
Initially, they sought to influence Pakistan’s CA via the 22-point manifesto mentioned 
above. However, moving well beyond this, some sought to ingratiate themselves within 
the public at large by highlighting what they saw as a key point of consensus within 
Pakistan’s Muslim majority: specifically, the ‘non-Muslim’ status of Pakistan’s Ahmadiyya. 
‘We’ Muslims are different from ‘those’ Ahmadiyya, they claimed. ‘We’ are endowed with 
special rights and privileges (e.g. access to the presidency). In fact to protect our 
community ‘we’ should support those prepared to defend our constitutional rights.   44
In 1952-3, several activists associated with a broad-based religious-cum-political 
formation known as the Majlis-ul-Ahrar-e-Islam (Council of ‘Free’ Muslims), as well as the 
Jama’at-e-Islami (Party of Islam), took to the streets of the Punjab in a series of violent 
protests demanding that Pakistan’s Ahmadiyya be assigned to Pakistan’s non-Muslim 
electorate. Their protests came to an end with a declaration of martial law. (In fact, key 
actors like Syed Abul ala Maududi, the leader of the Jama’at-e-Islami, were charged with 
44 See Kazi 2015, 63-4. 
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treason for their use of vigilante violence in defiance of state authority.) The state’s 
decision to invoke its emergency powers, however, was not used to derogate the rights of 
the Ahmadiyya. Instead, hewing much closer to an ‘Irish’ reading of religious freedom, the 
army intervened to ​protect​ those targeted in the course of the riots.  
When the dust finally settled, however, Pakistan’s CA turned its attention away 
from any (martial law-based) defense of religious freedom. Pakistan’s CA focused, instead, 
on the need for fresh provisions offering a more robust defense against encroachments on 
civilian power (e.g. provisions preventing the executive from suspending the country’s 
legislature).  In fact, this focus on civilian power soon reinforced brewing tensions 45
between Pakistan’s CA and the country’s powerful executive—tensions that came to a 
head when Pakistan’s Governor-General actually stepped in to dissolve the CA in October 
1954. A second CA was eventually convened to complete Pakistan’s first constitution in 
1956. But, as noted above, even this constitution was set aside, two years later, following 
the coup led by General Ayub. Still, the constitution promulgated by General Ayub in 1962 
(as amended in 1963) did not alter the right to religious freedom that Pakistan had 
imported from India. That right—first tested during the riots of 1952—remained firmly 
intact. 
Finally, during the last eight months of General Ayub’s regime, Pakistan’s Supreme 
Court intervened to clarify Pakistan’s approach to religious freedom with specific 
reference to the problem of public order. It did so in a high-profile case known as ​A.K. 
45 See Binder 1961, 352-9; Choudhury 1963, 48. 
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Shorish Kashmiri v West Pakistan ​(1969) reviewing the state’s decision to shutter an 
anti-Ahmadi newspaper known as ​Chattan​ published by one of the groups involved in the 
riots of 1952-53.  
In this case, the Supreme Court noted that—even apart from the special 
emergency powers associated with General Ayub’s martial law regime—the state was 
empowered by the constitutional language of Article 20 (known, at the time, as Article 10) 
to prohibit any derogatory article of a religious nature that might pose a risk to public 
order. In fact the Court adopted a rather conventional reading of religious freedom: it 
reiterated its condemnation of any religious vigilante who, acting in defiance of state 
authority, might aim to restrict the liberty of a fellow citizen, adding that each individual’s 
right to religious freedom was only complicated insofar as it might be said to touch on a 
further protection for the rights of religious groups—for example, a group-based right to 
public office or property.  The Court specifically rejected the view that Muslim bullies 46
might be permitted to define the parameters of their religious community unilaterally 
(that is, via vigilante action beyond the realm of constitutional authority and negotiated 
parliamentary power).  
The demise of General Ayub’s dictatorship later that year, followed two years later 
by the brutal civil war that liberated East Pakistan, however, dramatically reconfigured the 
ways in which existing constitutional provisions concerning religious liberty were read. 
In particular, the departure of East Pakistan followed by a return to civilian rule prompted 
46 See Saeed 2011, 17. 
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fresh efforts to shore up the power of parliament while, at the same time, promoting new 
forms of Muslim nationalism. Framed to offset enduring concerns about the divisive 
effects of ‘provincialism’, these efforts culminated in two changes—two ​constitutional 
changes—that slowly shifted the ways in which Article 10 (later, Article 20) and, thus, the 
politics of religious freedom were approached, interpreted, and re-read.  
 
B. Indigenizing Imported Text 
The first change emerged during the promulgation of Pakistan’s third Constitution 
in 1973. Even apart from this constitution’s specification of Islam as Pakistan’s state 
religion (Article 2), a new schedule (Schedule 3) was introduced requiring each President 
and Prime Minister to swear an oath, not only that he or she was a Muslim, but, to clarify 
this point, that he or she believed that the Prophet Mohammad was truly ‘the last of the 
Prophets’.  
The second adjustment emerged one year later in the form of Pakistan’s second 
constitutional amendment (1974). This amendment modified Article 260, regarding 
definitions, to declare that, within Pakistan, a ‘Muslim’ would henceforth be defined as 
one who ‘does not believe in, or recognize as a prophet or religious reformer, any person 
who claimed or claims to be a prophet … after Muhammad’.  
Returning to the underlying politics of constitutional interpretation, these two 
adjustments set in motion several changes in the meaning of Pakistan’s imported 
provisions concerning religious freedom. A proper understanding of these changes, 
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however, requires some appreciation for the targeted violence surrounding them. In April 
1973, almost immediately after the initial approval of Pakistan’s third Constitution, the 
same religious activists who had challenged Pakistan’s approach to the rights of the 
Ahmadiyya during the 1950s and 1960s—groups like the Majlis-ul-Ahrar-e-Islam (later 
refashioned, with religious parties like the Jama’at-e-Islami, as a new collective known as 
the Majlis-e-Amal [Council of Action])—reasserted themselves following another round of 
anti-Ahmadi skirmishes. Prime Minister Bhutto was unsettled by these skirmishes, but he 
did not respond with a further round of martial law. Instead, he nominated a high-level 
judicial commission under Supreme Court Justice Khwaja Mohammad Ahmad Samdani to 
investigate the clashes, alongside a special parliamentary committee chaired by the 
Attorney General.  This committee was asked to decide whether, and how, in light of 47
existing provisions concerning religious freedom, the formal legal status of the Ahmadiyya 
(as ‘Muslims’ or ‘non-Muslims’) might be examined in greater depth.  
Initially, Bhutto sought to determine whether the status of the Ahmadiyya should 
be examined by the Supreme Court or Pakistan’s Council of Islamic Ideology. In the 
absence of any claim suggesting that existing laws governing the Ahmadiyya were 
‘un-Islamic’, however, he eventually turned away from these two bodies (empowered to 
‘review’ existing laws) in favour of a fresh inquiry regarding the need for constitutional or 
statutory reforms—above all, reforms targeting the reach of religious self-identification as 
47 This committee was aided by a steering committee dominated by parliamentary ulema; 
see Qasmi 2014, 176-77, 180.  
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a manifestation of one’s (otherwise constitutionally protected) right to religious 
‘profession’.  
Bhutto’s focus on the role of parliament was not surprising given Pakistan’s recent 
return to civilian rule after more than ten years of dictatorship. However, with respect to 
religious freedom, this push in the direction of parliament (and, therein, the pursuit of 
majority sentiment) was pivotal. Briefly, right-wing religious activists stepped in to 
reiterate what they saw as a set of ‘majoritarian’ concerns regarding the ways in which, in 
describing themselves as ‘Muslims’, Pakistan’s Ahmadiyya actually ​diluted​ Muslim access 
to their distinctive constitutional rights (e.g. access to a Muslim presidency and/or a 
dedicated Muslim electorate). In fact, in their push to defend these rights, the activists in 
question sought to reverse the onus of responsibility for any violence that might surround 
their protests: whereas, in the past, the Ahmadiyya had been cast as the victims of 
right-wing protesters, these protesters now sought to cast themselves as victims—the 
victims of Ahmadi self-identification (as a form of doctrinal ‘provocation’) and, turning to 
Muslim constitutional rights, unlawful forms of ‘encroachment’. 
Struggling with ruling coalitions tied to right-wing parties in two out of Pakistan’s 
four provinces (Balochistan and Pakistan’s Northwest Frontier Province), Prime Minister 
Bhutto did not resist the purportedly ‘majoritarian’ arguments put forward by these 
right-wing activists. Instead, he sought to coopt them, fusing their concerns about Ahmadi 
‘provocation’ with an appreciation for constitutional provisions focused on ‘public order’. 
In fact, with a nod to some of his erstwhile opponents in the Majlis-ul-Ahrar-e-Islam, 
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Bhutto’s parliamentary committee slowly turned its attention to the promulgation of a 
constitutional amendment—Pakistan’s second constitutional amendment—targeting the 
definition of a Muslim in the context of Article 260.  
The leader of an Ahmadi branch known as the Qadiani was invited to defend his 
community’s ‘Muslim’ identity before those charged with considering this amendment. 
His remarks, however, were not confined to Pakistan’s 1973 Constitution. Instead, 
recalling some of the views first articulated by Pakistani Hindus during the course of 
Pakistan’s first CA, he couched his defense of religious freedom—and, specifically, 
religious self-identification—in broad global principles regarding freedom of conscience 
commonly articulated by the UN.  48
Unfortunately, National Assembly members like Ghulam Ghaus Hazarwi were 
broadly unsympathetic to such references. Hazarwi suggested that improved legal 
guidance was needed, not only to settle the rights of the Ahmadiyya, as citizens, but 
also—and especially—to prevent any further encroachment on Muslim majority rights.  49
His logic was simple: if as per the Constitution Pakistani Muslims were endowed with 
special rights, property, and privileges (e.g. access to the presidency), it followed that the 
state must be able to identify who, exactly, was a Muslim. ‘The state’, he noted, ‘must be 
able to … identify [both] its Muslim and [its] non-Muslim citizens’.   50
48 Qasmi 2014, 185-86. 
 
49 Qasmi 2014, 189. 
50 Qasmi 2014, 195. 
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To accomplish this, Pakistan’s Attorney General did not believe the government 
was required to prioritize an individual’s right to religious self-identification.  On the 51
contrary, with a two-thirds majority in both houses, the Attorney General noted that 
Pakistan’s parliament was empowered to amend the constitution, subjecting certain rights 
to ‘limitations’.  As such, Article 260 was amended, with no opposing votes and only a 52
few abstentions, to ensure that—as noted above—a ‘Muslim’ would be defined as one 
who did not believe in ‘any person who claimed or claims to be a prophet … after 
Muhammad’. Politically situated parliamentarians wrestled with the many possible 
meanings of a concept like ‘religious freedom’ while, at the same time, actively pressing 
for one. In effect, they sought to de-contest the meaning of concepts like ‘religious 
freedom’, or ‘Muslim’, placing their meaning beyond the realm of contemporary political 
debate. 
Throughout 1973 and 1974, Pakistan’s Attorney General noted that parliament 
was empowered to guard against any encroachment on Muslim constitutional 
prerogatives—encroachments that, he argued, might create some form of ‘tangible 
material damage’ (e.g. diluted access to the presidency or a separate Muslim electorate) 
followed, in due course, by popular resistance to such damage in the form of public 
disorder. To preempt this agitation and, thus, to avoid public disorder (as permitted, 
51 For the ways in which bureaucratic forms of state recognition interact with the practice 
(and politics) of religious ‘self-identification’, see Nelson and Shah. 
52 See Qasmi 2014, 192-93, 196; Kazi 2015, 91. 
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following both Ireland and India, by Article 20), he simply argued that parliament was 
entitled to address, by way      of constitutional amendments targeting definitions (Article 
260) and oaths (Schedule 3), a pattern of religious ‘provocation’ associated with Ahmadi 
religious practices—practices (however peaceful) construed as a form of ‘false belonging’.
 53
 
C. Ireland/India as an Empty Signifier 
Although Pakistan’s second constitutional amendment redefined the Ahmadiyya as 
‘non-Muslims’ in 1974, Pakistan’s superior judiciary did not immediately abandon its 
previous reading of Article 20. In 1978, for instance, the Lahore High Court issued a rather 
nuanced judgment in the case of ​A.R. Mubashir v A.A. Shah​, holding that, although official 
recognition of the Ahmadiyya as Muslims was constitutionally barred, their fundamental 
right to peaceful religious practice (as citizens) was not affected. In effect, the Court held 
that the peaceful religious practices of the Ahmadiyya—focusing, specifically, on practices 
referring to Ahmadi places of worship as ‘mosques’—were neither a provocation 
amounting to a public nuisance nor a threat to Muslim ‘property’. Again, recalling 
Kashmiri​ (1969), the Court reiterated that Pakistan’s Ahmadiyya could only be excluded 
from ‘Muslim’ matters clearly defined in law—matters of public office, for instance, or 
exclusive forms of property.  
At the same time, however, just across the border in India, the Indian Supreme 
53 Qasmi 2014, 193, 224. 
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Court had begun to reassess its own understanding of group-based religious rights, 
highlighting, in particular, the power of the state to identify the (constitutionally 
protected) ‘essential’ practices of any religious denomination and, by extension, any 
‘non-essential’ practices subject to legal reform.  In fact this ‘Indian’ notion that states 54
were empowered to regulate the ‘non-essential’ practices of religion was also in place 
during Pakistan’s first CA (1947-54), wherein a provisional article (Article 12) was included 
in the Interim Report issued by the CA’s Fundamental Rights Committee stipulating that, 
‘subject to regulations’, every denomination ‘shall have the right to procure … articles 
which are proved as being essential for worship’. This Article, however, was dropped from 
Pakistan’s first constitution in 1956, forcing Pakistani judges to rely on jurisprudence from 
India (rather than their own constitution) whenever they sought to consider the statutory 
regulation of religious practices seen as ‘non-essential’.  
Indian and Pakistani judges, however, adopted very different approaches to the 
notion of ‘essential’ and ‘non-essential’ religious practices. Whereas India sought to 
regulate ‘non-essential’ religious practices, for instance, Pakistan stressed (a) essential 
Muslim​ practices (protected from adverse encroachment) as well as (b) essential 
non​-​Muslim​ practices construed as a provocation to public disorder and, then, legally 
54 Ahmad 2014, 13. 
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restricted as such.   55
During the dictatorship of General Zia-ul-Haq (1977-88), Pakistani officials facing 
yet another round of violent religious protests by right-wing anti-Ahmadi activists stepped 
in to reframe—that is, further restrict—the constitutional meaning of religious freedom. 
In particular, they stepped in to prohibit Pakistan’s Ahmadiyya from using ostensibly 
‘Muslim’ words (e.g. ​masjid​ or mosque) and ‘Muslim’ practices (e.g. the ​azaan​ or call to 
prayer), describing Ahmadi attachments to such words and practices as (a) ‘non-essential’ 
for the Ahmadiyya in the practice of their faith and, in any case, (b) a provocative form of 
‘encroachment’ on the special religious ‘property’ of Muslims.   56
This notion that Muslim property might include common words like ​masjid​ or 
peaceful religious practices like the ​azaan​ had already emerged in comments made by 
Pakistan’s Attorney General during the parliamentary debates surrounding Pakistan’s 
second constitutional amendment (1974).  But, after 1985, General Zia stepped in to 57
reinforce these ideas with further statutory reforms, modifying Section 298 of the 
Pakistan Penal Code—a colonial law regarding blasphemy that sought to curtail threats to 
55 On religious freedom restrictions in India, see Osurie (2013); again,​ public order 
concerns have been cited to support restrictions on (‘non-essential’) minority practices 
that offend the sentiments of the majority. 
56 On the political and ‘public order’ motivations underpinning Zia’s reforms, see Saeed 
2011, 88; Kazi 2015, 129. 
57 Qasmi 2014, 192. 
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inter- and intra-religious harmony—to ensure that, legally speaking, the Ahmadiyya would 
no longer be permitted to access words like ​masjid​ or practices like the ​azaan​ insofar as 
these were seen as being associated with the ‘proprietary’ features of Islam.  In short, 58
Zia responded to ongoing pressure on the streets (a.k.a. threats to public order and 
religious harmony) by (a) emptying existing ideas about ‘essential practices’ or ‘religious 
property’ of their prior meaning and, then, (b) filling them up again with ​new​ forms of 
meaning carefully designed to privilege Pakistan’s Muslim majority. 
Zia’s property and public-order-based re-reading of ‘essential’ religious practices 
was soon taken up in a landmark Supreme Court case known as ​Zaheeruddin ​(1993). In 
this case—by far the most important case treating Pakistan’s imported constitutional 
provisions regarding religious freedom as a basket of ‘empty signifiers’—a group of 
Ahmadiyya urged the Court to overturn their prior convictions for (a) wearing badges 
bearing the ​kalima​ (the Muslim profession of faith) and (b) celebrating an Ahmadi 
holiday—the centenary of Mirza Ghulam Ahmad’s contested revelations—in the Punjabi 
city of Jhang.  The Supreme Court, however, turning to Pakistan’s Constitution (Article 59
20), Pakistan’s (revised) Penal Code (Section 298), and a series of Indian Supreme Court 
judgments regarding the meaning of ‘essential’ religious practices, upheld their 
58 Ahmed 2009 describes the colonial roots of Pakistan’s blasphemy law but does not 
address the ways in which Pakistan’s ​religious freedom​ laws (as constitutional laws) were 
explicitly set​ ​apart​ ​from the British tradition. 
59 Lau 1995; Mahmud 1995. 
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convictions.  It upheld their convictions in light of three points directly seeking to empty 60
Pakistan’s imported constitutional provisions regarding religious freedom of their prior 
meaning while, at the same time, filling them up again with politically situated forms of 
new meaning.  
First, turning to the exclusive ‘property’ of Muslims, the Court re-framed several 
Indian and American Supreme Court judgments to argue that ‘[the] Ahmadis, as 
non-Muslims, could not use Islamic epithets in public [for example, during their 
celebrations in Jhang] without violating … [Pakistani] trademark laws’.  In particular, the 61
court held that, just as the presidency had been construed as a type of Muslim property, 
Muslims ​alone​ held a proprietary claim to certain religious words and practices.   62
Second, turning to the matter of peaceful religious practice, the Court drew on a 
series of Indian Supreme Court judgments to insist that, whenever questions emerged 
regarding the ‘essential’ features of a particular faith, the group seeking to avoid 
regulation was required to prove its essential features within a court of law. Because the 
Ahmadiyya had, apparently, ​failed​ to prove that their celebrations in Jhang were essential, 
the Court explained that those celebrations could be described as ‘non-essential’ and, 
then, legally regulated as such (without, the Court held, undermining their fundamental 
60 See Ahmad 2014, 11. 
61 Khan 2011, 509. 
62 In Malaysia, the courts adopted a similar view in barring Christians from using Muslim 
words like ‘Allah’; see Neo 2014. 
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right to practice the essential features of their faith).  
Finally, and most importantly, returning to Article 20, the Court held that, within 
Pakistan, ‘Ahmadi religious practice[s], however peaceful, angered and offended the Sunni 
majority; … [so] to maintain law and order, Pakistan would … need to control [them]’.  63
This reading of Article 20’s reference to public order—a nearly ubiquitous feature of 
religious-freedom provisions over time and around the world—dramatically shifted 
Pakistan’s approach to the constitutional provisions it had initially imported from Ireland. 
In particular, Pakistan’s new reading of religious freedom appeared to restrict   ‘essential’ 
and ‘peaceful’ Ahmadi practices (as ‘provocative’) in a ​preemptive​ bid to avoid the 
possibility of future violence by Pakistan’s Muslim majority.   64
63 Khan 2003, 228 and 2011, 509. Specifically, the Supreme Court described the 
Ahmadiyya faith as ‘a serious and organized attack on [Islam’s] ideological frontiers’ that is 
‘bound to give rise to a serious law and order situation’, ​Zaheeruddin​ 1993, 1765. In 
particular, the Court noted that Muslims could not be blamed for losing ‘control’ after 
encountering the ‘blasphemous’ material produced by Mirza Ghulam Ahmad. ‘[I]t is’ they 
argued, ‘like permitting [a] civil war’, 1777; also Alvi. 
64 Here, the Pakistan Supreme Court ignored U.S. reasoning noting that, although the state 
was ​not​ empowered to ban the peaceful and essential practices of ​selected​ religious 
groups, it could, for the sake of public order, legally regulate the practices of ​all​ religious 
groups (for example, with an administrative requirement noting that any group engaged 
in a religious procession would have to obtain a permit, however ‘essential’ the procession 
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D. Religious Freedom, Public Order, and (Majoritarian) Parliamentary Power 
Recalling Pierre Legrand’s notions of intersubjective or interpretive ‘failure’ in the 
realm of legal transplants, Amjad Mahmood Khan (2011) and Tariq Ahmad (2014) have 
argued that, in the case of ​Zaheeruddin​, Pakistan’s Supreme Court actively ‘mis-translated’ 
specific foreign laws—both American and Indian constitutional laws as well as 
international human rights laws. This assessment, however, merely revives a number of 
questions regarding the link between legal ​texts​ and the larger ​political​ contexts within 
which legal ​meanings​ are created. What were the domestic​ ​political​ ​factors that drove the 
Court’s reasoning in ​Zaheeruddin​? What were the political factors that shaped Pakistan’s 
approach to the meaning of imported foreign texts?  
Focusing on what she calls ‘core juridical signifiers’ (i.e. fundamental rights), Saadia 
Saeed (2011) examines the ways in which Pakistan slowly invested specific constitutional 
principles with new meaning.  In particular, she attributes Pakistan’s re-purposing of 65
constitutional provisions concerning religious freedom to the influence of General Zia 
during the early-to-mid 1980s. This focus on General Zia, however, is difficult to reconcile 
with the history of Pakistan’s legal record—above all, the fact that crucial Supreme Court 
may be). In Pakistan, the Court held that the state was entitled to ban, not a particular 
practice for all religious groups, but almost ​all​ of the practices of a ​particular​ group.  
65 For a similar re-reading of U.S. Supreme Court jurisprudence regarding free speech in 
Israel, see Jacobsohn 1993. 
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decisions seeking to protect the Ahmadiyya (e.g. ​Mubashir​ 1978) were delivered after the 
coup that brought General Zia to power and, moreover, the fact that key decisions 
restricting the Ahmadiyya (e.g. ​Zaheeruddin​ 1993) were delivered after Zia died and, 
indeed, after Pakistan’s 1973 Constitution was restored.  
Broadly, Saeed’s argument is difficult to reconcile with the fact that much of the 
political energy driving restrictions on the religious freedom of the Ahmadiyya—for 
example, Pakistan’s second constitutional amendment—emerged ​before​ the arrival of 
General Zia via assertions of majoritarian parliamentary power.  Clearly, Zia extended 66
what parliament had begun. But, since 1974, and despite numerous efforts to annul 
religious ordinances promulgated by General Ayub (regarding inheritance) as well as 
General Zia (regarding adultery), Pakistan’s National Assembly has ​not​ sought to annul 
Zia’s amendments in the realm of religious freedom.  In fact, as Saeed herself points out, 67
quoting former Supreme Court judge Fakruddin Ebrahim (who served as lead counsel for 
66 Saeed 2011, 4, 22. 
67 When Prime Minister Benazir Bhutto suggested blasphemy law amendments in 1994 
(e.g. imprisonment for false allegations), her proposals were defeated in parliament. 
When parliamentarian Sherry Rehman called for such reforms after the assassination of 
Governor Salman Taseer (who did the same in 2011), she faced death threats. Even today, 
Zia’s reforms remain intact. In 2015, however, the Pakistan Supreme Court upheld the 
execution of Taseer’s assassin in a judgment criticizing vigilante violence; see ​Mumtaz 
Qadri v State​ (2015). 
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the Ahmadiyya during the early stages of ​Zaheeruddin​), the judges who decided 
Zaheeruddin​ were not beholden to Zia; as common political actors, he notes, they were 
simply ‘afraid … of becoming unpopular’.  68
Martin Lau (1996) is well known for his assessment of ‘Islamization’ in the context 
of Pakistan’s courts. But, as an explanation for Pakistan’s efforts to ‘fill up’ imported 
constitutional provisions with new forms of legal meaning, Lau’s focus on ‘religious 
reasoning’ ​within​ the judiciary is difficult to reconcile with the fact that such reasoning 
was notably ​absent​ in several key decisions: ​Kashmiri​ (1969), ​Mubashir​ (1978), and 
Mujibur Rahman​ (1988), not to mention ​Zaheeruddin​ (1993). As noted above, these 
decisions concerning religious freedom conspicuously avoided any Islamic references, 
preferring, instead, references to Indian or American judgments regarding the parameters 
of religious property.  Indeed, as Anser Aftab Kazi  (2015) points out, the jurisprudential 69
record in ​Zaheeruddin ​shows how religious freedom was actually ‘translated into, and 
proscribed within’, a secular (‘liberal’) legal order.  Pakistan’s new reading of religious 70
freedom was not a religious reading. It was, by and large, a majoritarian political reading 
rooted in secular notions of property, provocation, and public order. 
Ali Usman Qasmi (2014) does not trace the shifting meaning of religious freedom 
68  Saeed 2011, 33; see also Mahmud 1995, 83, 96. 
69 For a similar account of the Federal Shariat Court judgment in ​Mujibur Rahman v 
Pakistan​ (1988) PLD (SC) 167, see Kazi 2015, 111, 113.  
70 Kazi 2015, 123, 126-7. 
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to the interventions of Pakistani generals or judges. He traces this pattern to religious 
parties sitting in Pakistan’s parliament. Still, Qasmi’s focus on religious parties is difficult to 
reconcile with the fact that, inside parliament, these parties were always greatly 
outnumbered by those tied to mainstream secular parties like the Pakistan Muslim League 
(PML) and, especially, the Pakistan People’s Party (PPP)—not only in the PPP-led 
government of 1974 (13 per cent religious parties in parliament), but more generally: 
1988, 1990, 1993, 1997, 2008, 2013, even today. The influence of religious parties in 
parliament is, thus, not unlike the influence of the religious activists who sought to 
influence Pakistan’s CA. In the end, the reach of their 22-point manifesto was bound up 
with the acquiescence of the larger CA.  
Indeed, what accounts for Pakistan’s re-reading of its imported religious freedom 
provisions is not the ‘Islamizing’ dictatorship of General Zia, the ‘religious’ reasoning of its 
courts, or the power of ‘Islamist’ parties in parliament. What accounts for Pakistan’s 
approach to religious freedom is actually a much wider pattern in which enumerated 
fundamental rights, imported from Ireland, via India, fueled right-wing protests and, then, 
within Pakistan’s National Assembly, a majoritarian approach to politics in which ongoing 
efforts to protect the rights of the majority were thought to require new forms of minority 
religious constraint.  
The reach of this perspective, rooted in majoritarian politics underpinned by 
right-wing protests, emerged again quite recently. In October 2017, Pakistan’s National 
Assembly responded to yet another round of public protests by reversing a set of reforms 
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in Pakistan’s Election Act (2017). Specifically, the Assembly voted to reverse a change in 
the oath taken by would-be candidates for national and provincial elections, as well as a 
change in the bureaucratic procedures used to clarify the religion of such candidates. 
Recalling Schedule 3 of Pakistan’s 1973 Constitution, the first change sought to replace an 
ostensibly religious affirmation (‘I solemnly swear’) with a simple declaration (‘I believe’) 
concerning ‘the absolute and unqualified finality of the prophethood of Muhammad’. 
(Those who refused to sign this declaration were relegated to Pakistan’s non-Muslim 
electorate.) The second change grew out of an earlier effort, led by General Pervez 
Musharraf (1999-2007), to abolish separate electorates for non-Muslims while, at the 
same time, maintaining an exception for the Ahmadiyya.  When parliament intervened to 71
remove the bureaucratic procedure whereby individual Ahmadi candidates could be 
exposed, enormous protests erupted—in fact, Islamabad was placed under siege. Shortly 
thereafter, the National Assembly intervened to address what is saw as the will of the 
‘majority’. Claiming to defend the special rights of Muslims, it voted (unanimously) to 
reverse​ its earlier reforms.   72
Again, what accounts for Pakistan’s re-reading of its imported constitutional 
provisions concerning religious freedom is not the ‘Islamizing’ influence of its dictators, 
the ‘religious’ reasoning of its courts, or the power of its ‘Islamist’ parties. What 
accounts for this re-reading is a much wider pattern rooted in right-wing protests and the 
71 See ​Brief on Ahmadis and Elections. 
 
72 See ‘How the Islamabad Protests Happened’. 
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majoritarian politics of parliament.  
 
Conclusion 
Clearly, for those with an interest in constitutional borrowing, mapping textual 
transfers is no longer enough. On the contrary, the meaning of a borrowed reference only 
emerges within a particular political context. The challenge lies in tracking the political 
motivations that underpin the importation (and, then, the ‘re-signification’) of foreign 
legal texts.  
In Pakistan, it was not the religious orientation of judges, the influence of religious 
parliamentarians, or the formal promulgation of religious laws so much as a growing 
appreciation for the public’s attachment to a restricted sense of Muslim boundaries—and, 
within this, a growing fear that any encroachment on those boundaries might engender 
private forms of religious vigilantism or public rioting—that slowly reconfigured the 
meaning of constitutional clauses initially imported from outside. These imported clauses 
did not treat a fundamental right to religious freedom as absolute; on the contrary, and 
from the very beginning, they explicitly noted that the enforceability of any constitutional 
right to religious freedom was politically contingent—contingent on a constantly shifting 
official assessment of religious incitement, violence, and disorder. 
 Drawing inspiration from the anti-colonial politics of Ireland and, then, India more 
than powerful European states like Britain, Pakistan clearly illustrates the ways in which 
explicit textual transplants are shaped by the politics of constitutional ​meaning​. Over 
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time, and in different ways, Pakistani judges, politicians, and executive officials slowly 
adjusted their approach to right-wing patterns of religious-cum-political agitation. Above 
all, they reversed the onus of responsibility surrounding religious violence, gradually 
stressing the ways in which they were constitutionally empowered to derogate the rights 
of any religious practitioner, no matter how peaceful, who might be recast (even 
preemptively) as a religious ‘provocateur’ and, as such, a driver of public disorder.  
In debates regarding the status of foreign law within the United States, the late 
Supreme Court Justice Antonin Scalia famously noted that American judges must rely on 
‘[t]he standards of decency of American society—not the standards … of the world [or 
any] … other countr[y]’.  In Pakistan, one might argue, the same view prevailed, not only 73
(following Scalia) with respect to ‘domestic’ laws, but also with respect to Pakistan’s 
domestic reading of imported ‘foreign’ laws. In effect, constitutional actors found new 
ways to accommodate longstanding debates regarding the dynamics of constitutional 
borrowing: treating religious freedom as a constitutional ‘empty signifier’, they found new 
ways to have Alan Watson’s (1974) textual ​cake​ while, at the same time, following 
Legrand (2001), ​eating​ it in a Pakistani way. Departing from both Ireland and India, this 
‘Pakistani’ way was no longer sensitive to the rights of individuals or minorities; it 
privileged efforts within Pakistan’s National Assembly to recast, following periodic bouts 
of public violence, the rather delicate parameters of Pakistan’s Muslim majority. 
 
73 See Chaudhry 2006, 7. 
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